Which solution concepts satisfy backward induction (BI)? We de…ne a property-we call it Di¤erence-which relates the behavior of a solution concept on a whole tree to its behavior on any truncation of the tree-obtained by pruning from a subtree all moves disallowed by the solution concept in question. Di¤erence (together with some background properties) characterizes the BI algorithm in perfect-information (PI) trees. We propose it as the de…nition of BI in general (non-PI) trees as well. Our main …nding is a non-monotonicity in BI: A solution concept S can satisfy BI while another solution concept R, though a re…nement of S, may not. We argue that this has an important implication for the program of re…ning Nash equilibrium.
Introduction
The idea of backward induction (BI) has a long history in game theory, going back to von Neumann and Morgenstern (18, 1944) . (See Schwalbe and Walker (15, 2001) .) It is a staple of game-theoretic applications, and a standard criterion which solution concepts are expected to satisfy. Yet, we will suggest that even today there are some surprises and puzzles concerning BI.
To start, we need a de…nition of BI. Even this has not been …rmly established. Kohlberg and Mertens (5, 1986 , p.1006) wrote:
In games of perfect information, the meaning of this requirement is clear (Zermelo (19, 1912) ). But in games of imperfect information the meaning is ambiguous as best.
By this they mean that, in perfect-information (PI) game trees, the idea of BI is clearly implemented by the BI algorithm. But, the idea of BI should apply beyond these trees-so, there is the question of how it applies, absent being able to refer directly to the algorithm. A number of proposals have been put forth in the literature. However, we will argue that these fail to capture BI at either the formal or the intuitive level.
Here, we propose what we call the Di¤erence Property as the de…nition of BI. We describe this property in Section 3. For now, simply think of it as a way of building up the solution of a tree from the solution of each of its subtrees-just as the BI algorithm does in PI trees. We will argue that Di¤erence does capture the general idea of BI at both the formal and the intuitive levels.
What do we learn from o¤ering a general de…nition of BI? We show the following:
Main Result: There exists solution concepts S and R, such that S satis…es BI and R fails BI, even though R is a re…nement of S.
This says that there is a basic non-monotonicity in whether or not a solution concept satis…es BI. A solution concept may fail BI, even if it is a re…nement of a solution concept which satis…es BI. Moreover, we show that this is the case for "standard" solution concepts-in the proof, we take S to be sequential equilibrium and R to be proper equilibrium. (In particular, then, both solution concepts are nonempty.) We believe this …nding has an important implication for the program of re…ning Nash equilibrium. Since Kohlberg and Mertens (5, 1986) , the program has proceeded by searching for a solution concept which satis…es one or other list of desirable axioms-e.g., invariance, admissibility, small worlds, etc. (See (5, 1986 , p.1020) for the original list of axioms. There have been many subsequent lists.) Indeed, the Holy Grail for this program would be an agreed-upon list of axioms which succeeds in identifying precisely one solution concept. Re…nement theorists would consider such a solution concept to be the 'ultimate'meaning of rationality in the game context.
In practice, the re…nements program has adopted a less than purely axiomatic approach. Some of the axioms which have been proposed are truly axioms-i.e., properties demanded of a solution concept. (Our Di¤erence property is of this type.) But, other axioms are not truly axioms. While they talk about how a solution concept should behave, they do so in terms of some other solution concepts, and are therefore circular in nature.
The leading such 'quasi-axiom' is about BI. In some papers (e.g., Kohlberg and Mertens (5, 1986 ), Hillas (3, 1990 ), Govindan and Wilson (2, 2009)), the BI requirement is that a solution concept contain a sequential equilibrium. Why does this circularity matter? Take as given that sequential equilibrium satis…es BI. (Indeed, we say it does, since it satis…es Di¤erence.) But, now add other axioms from some list, just as the literature does. This is e¤ectively asking that a good solution concept contain a re…nement of sequential equilibrium, where the re…nement is de…ned implicitly by these other axioms. Because of our non-monotonicity result, there is no guarantee that such a re…nement will satisfy BI. That is, in the presence of other axioms, the BI quasi-axiom may not capture the meaning of BI. (Of course, this is if our de…nition of BI is granted.)
Some papers state a BI quasi-axiom which takes the form of requiring that a solution concept contain a proper equilibrium (e.g., Mertens (9, 1989) , (10, 1992) ). In this case, the issue is even more immediate: Proper equilibrium fails Di¤erence and therefore, under our de…nition, does not satisfy BI even in its own right.
Our conclusion is that BI must be stated as a non-circular axiom. Then, to determine whether or not a certain solution concept satis…es BI, one must go back to '…rst principles'and give a direct proof that it satis…es the axiom, or give a counterexample. Of course, we think the appropriate BI axiom is Di¤erence.
Kohlberg and Mertens (5, 1986 , p.1036) themselves expressed reservations about the use of what we are calling quasi-axioms:
Our feeling, however, is that the source of the di¢ culty is in the use of a concept like sequential equilibrium. While sequentiality, invariance, dummy properties, etc., are reasonable properties against which a proposed solution concept may be checked, they cannot serve as a de…nition or an axiom ....
We go further. We believe our paper shows that a full- ‡edged axiomatic approach to re…nements is not only desirable, but essential.
Formulation
We …x the following notation throughout. Given sets X 1 ; : : : ; X I , write X = I i=1 X i and X i = j6 =i X j . Likewise, given maps f i : X i ! Y i , i = 1; : : : ; I, write f : X ! Y for the product map, i.e., f (x 1 ; : : : ; x I ) = (f 1 (x 1 ); : : : ; f I (x I )). De…ne product maps f i : X i ! Y i analogously. If X is either a …nite or a closed subset of R n , let M(X) be the set of Borel probability measures on X.
Write Supp for the support of 2 M(X). First, the formalities of a game tree: We consider …nite extensive-form games of perfect recall (Kuhn (7, 1950) , (8, 1953) ) with the exception that we allow a non-terminal node to have only one outgoing branch (rather than two). We denote a typical such game by , and let N be the set of non-terminal nodes and Z be the set of terminal nodes. The players are labelled i = 1; : : : ; I. Write H i for the family of information sets for player i and H = S I i=1 H i for the family of all information sets. (Recall, under the Kuhn de…nition of a tree, an information set is a subset of N .) Write M i [h] for the set of moves m available to i at h 2 H i . (Recall, under the Kuhn de…nition of a tree, a move is a subset of N .) A pure strategy s i for player i maps each h 2 H i to some
Write S i for the set of pure strategies for player i, and i = M(S i ) (with typical element i ) for the set of mixed strategies. The map : S ! Z takes each pure-strategy pro…le into the terminal node it reaches.
Let i : Z ! R be the payo¤ function for player i. The outcome map : Z ! R I is given by (Note that need not be injective.) Write i : S ! R for player i's strategic-form payo¤ function, i.e., i = i . Extend i to i i in the usual way.
A strategy pro…le 2 induces a distribution over outcomes, i.e., the measure in M(R I ) given by the image measure of under . In particular, the probability of outcome x 2 R I is (( ) 1 (x)). Call strategy pro…les and 0 outcome equivalent if they induce the same distribution on outcomes. Note, we can (and do) de…ne this notion of outcome equivalence, even when and 0 are strategy pro…les in two (possibly di¤erent) I-player games. Likewise, given subsets of strategy pro…les Q and Q 0 (of two, possibly di¤erent, I-player games), say that Q induces the same outcomes as Q 0 if, for each 0 2 Q 0 , there is some 2 Q such that and 0 are outcome equivalent. Call Q and Q 0 outcome equivalent if Q induces the same outcomes as Q 0 , and Q 0 induces the same outcomes as Q.
i (h)) for the set of strategies i (resp. i ) that reach h. (Note carefully that we abuse notation here, since i (h) need not be a product set.) Say a strategy pro…le 2 allows a move m if m 2 M i [h], where h is allowed by , and m is played with strictly positive probability under . Given a subset of strategy pro…les Q , say Q allows a move m if there is some 2 which allows m.
A solution concept S associates with each game tree a family of subsets of strategy pro…les for . Formally, a solution concept S (on a family of games G) maps each tree (in G) to a family of subsets of strategy pro…les for the tree, i.e. S( ) 2 . The family S( ) is called the solution of . Each element of S( ), i.e., each subset of mixed-strategy pro…les Q 2 S( ), is called a component of the solution. Some familiar examples: For Nash equilibrium, take the solution of a game to consist of multiple components, where each component is a singleton and consists of a particular Nash equilibrium. Or, following Kohlberg and Mertens (5, 1986 ) and their successors, we could take each component to consist of a connected set of Nash equilibria. For iterated (strong or weak) dominance, we could take the solution to consist of a single component-viz., all the iterated undominated pro…les.
Say solution concept R is a re…nement of S if, for each game and every R 2 R( ), there is a Q 2 S( ) so that Q induces the same outcomes as R.
We note that we have given our de…nitions in terms of mixed strategies. Of course, some solution concepts (e.g., sequential equilibrium) are de…ned using behavioral strategies. When needed, we will understand all the preceding de…nitions to be in terms of behavioral strategies-and use the notation i for a behavioral strategy for player i.
Backward Induction
What is backward induction? Here is the intuitive idea: Fix a tree and a subtree of . Now discard , leaving behind only the solution on this subtree-leaving behind the "ghost"of the subtree, if you like. Then, we don't change our original analysis. Let us now formalize this idea.
First, we need to specify what it means to delete a subtree, leaving behind only the solution on the subtree. The relevant concept goes back to Kuhn (8, 1953 , p.208); we will call it a di¤erence tree. A di¤erence tree is de…ned relative to a solution concept S. Begin with a tree and a subtree of . Fix a nonempty component of S( ), which we will denote Q . The (S; Q )-di¤erence tree is obtained by deleting from the original tree any move not allowed by Q . It is readily veri…ed that each (S; Q )-di¤erence tree is a well-de…ned game tree. (This uses the fact that we required Q to be nonempty.) Write S;Q for the (S; Q )-di¤erence tree. Note, the di¤erence tree depends on a solution concept, subtree, and particular component of the solution on the subtree. Now, the Di¤erence property. Recall, the idea was that we don't change our original analysis when we replace a tree with a di¤erence tree. We can now state this precisely: How does the de…nition of Di¤erence capture the idea of BI? The way BI is usually explained is that future play in the game is used to pin down current play. The BI algorithm implements this idea in PI trees. Our Di¤erence property works the same way-in general trees. Solutions on subtrees yield di¤erence trees, which are used to pin down the solution on the overall tree. Di¤erence formalizes this idea as: Each (distribution on) outcome(s) allowed by the solution on the overall tree must also be allowed by the solution of some di¤erence tree.
Later in this section, we will come back to discuss a subtlety in the de…nition of Di¤erence-viz., why we require that the solution on the whole tree be included in the solution on the di¤erence tree, and not vice versa. In Sections 5b-c we will explain why some other possible de…nitions of BI do not work. But, …rst, we record the formal connection between Di¤erence and BI. We show that Di¤erence-plus some background properties-characterizes the BI algorithm in PI trees satisfying a no-ties requirement.
First, this requirement: 
In words, a game satis…es SPC if whenever player i is indi¤erent between two terminal nodes over which he is decisive, those two terminal nodes are outcome equivalent. It is clear that in a PI game satisfying SPC, there is a unique BI outcome. Moreover, SPC appears to be a minimal requirement for this purpose.
We will also have two background properties:
is a nonempty component of S( ).
A strategy i is optimal under
(R) A solution concept S satis…es Rationality (on G) if, for each tree (in G) and each component Q 2 S ( ), any pro…le 2 Q consists of rational strategies.
We can now state the formal connection between Di¤erence and BI. (ii) If each component of S is outcome equivalent to the BI algorithm on every PI tree satisfying SPC, then S satis…es (E), (R), and (D) when restricting the domain of the solution concept to these trees.
Proof. Part (i):
The proof is by induction on the length of the tree. For a tree of length 1, the result is immediate from (E), (R), and the fact that the game satis…es SPC. So, suppose the statement holds for any tree of length l or less. Consider the tree obtained by deleting from each immediate subtree k any move not allowed by Q k . Call this tree S . Then, in S , each of i's choices k = 1; : : : ; K leads to a unique outcome in the associated subtree. Of course, these outcomes do not depend on the particular choices of Q k .
Using SPC, all rational strategies for i (in S ) are outcome equivalent. By (E), there is a nonempty component of S( S ). By (R), any such component must be outcome equivalent to BI in S -and, therefore, outcome equivalent to BI in . Now, successively apply (D) to each subtree, so that any outcome allowed by any component of the solution on the overall tree must be allowed by the component on S . (This uses the fact that there is a unique outcome in this di¤erence tree and this outcome does not depend on the initial choice of solutions Q k .) It follows that any outcome allowed by any component of the solution on the overall tree must be the BI outcome in that tree. By (E), the solution must have some nonempty component, establishing part (i). Part (ii): Fix a solution concept S, as in the premise. It is immediate that S satis…es (E) and (R). We show (D). Fix a tree satisfying SPC, so that there is a unique BI outcome. Fix also a subtree and a component Q 2 S( ). Consider the (S; Q )-di¤erence tree S;Q . It, too, is a PI tree satisfying SPC, and so has a unique BI outcome. But this must coincide with the BI outcome in , since deleting (from the subtree) any move precluded by Q does not delete the BI outcome in . This establishes (D).
Back to the de…nition of (D). Why not require instead the reverse inclusion-i.e., that the solution on a di¤erence tree be contained in the solution on the whole tree? The reason is simple. Consider the tree in Figure 3 .2, the tree in Figure 3 .3 (which is the subtree of that begins after Ann chooses In), and the tree in Figure 3 .4. Let G = f ; ; g. If S satis…es (E) and (R), then S( ) = ffLef tgg. So, is the (S; fLef tg)-di¤erence tree. Again, (E) and (R) imply that S( ) = ff(Out; Lef t)gg. By (D), Ann must then play Out in any Q 2 S( ), yielding the BI outcome (as required by Theorem 3.1). Now change the de…nition of Di¤erence to require instead the reverse inclusion. Consider a solution concept R on G given by R( ) = ffLef tgg, R( ) = ff(Out; Lef t)gg, and R( ) = ffOut; Ing fLef tgg. This satis…es (E), (R), and the reverse version of Di¤erence on the domain G. But, R is not outcome equivalent to BI on this family of trees.
The problem here is clear: The idea of BI is that solutions on parts of the tree should be used to pin down the solution on the whole tree. Indeed, (D) uses solutions on di¤erence trees to pin down the solution on the whole tree. If we change Di¤erence to require instead the reverse inclusion, then we see that solutions on di¤erence trees do not pin down the solution on the whole tree.
In Sections 5b-c , we will review some other proposed de…nitions of BI-these also fail to implement the idea that solutions on parts of the tree pin down the solution on the overall tree. We will also point out another subtlety in the de…nition of Di¤erence.
Main Theorem
We state and prove our main result. In the proof of the theorem, we will take S to be sequential equilibrium and R to be proper equilibrium.
Recall some de…nitions from Kreps and Wilson (6, 1982) . A pair ( ; ) is an assessment if is a pro…le of behavioral strategies and is a system of beliefs. (That is:
: H ! M(N ) with each (h)(h) = 1.) The assessment is consistent if there is a sequence ( k ; k ) ! ( ; ) where each k is a pro…le of completely mixed behavioral strategies. (That is: For each i and h i 2 H i ,
and each k is derived from k by conditioning.) An assessment ( ; ) is a sequential equilibrium if it is consistent and, for each i, every i (h i ) is optimal under (among strategies in S i (h i )). We de…ne the sequential equilibrium solution concept S SE by S SE ( ) = ff g : there is an assessment s.t. ( ; ) is a sequential equilibrium of g.
For the connection to (D), we need some more notation. Fix a solution concept S, a tree , a subtree of , and consider a di¤erence tree S;Q . We write H i (resp. H) for the family of i's (resp. the family of all) information sets in this di¤erence tree. Write H for the family of information sets in , and note that there is an injective mapping : H ! H with h ( h). Write M i [ h i ] for the moves available to i at h i in the di¤erence tree, and note that, for each h i , there is an injective mapping
If s i is a pure strategy for i in the di¤erence tree, we write [ s i ] for the set of pure strategies for i in which coincide with s i in the di¤erence tree.
Proposition 4.1 The solution concept S S E satis…es (D).
Proof. Fix a tree and some = ( 1 ; : : : ; I ) with f g 2 S SE ( ). Then, there exists some system of beliefs : H ! M(N ) such that ( ; ) is a sequential equilibrium. Fix a subtree . For each information set h i of , set i (h i ) = i (h i ) and (h i ) = (h i ). It is immediate that ( ; ) is a sequential equilibrium of , i.e., f g 2 S SE ( ).
Construct the di¤erence tree SE,f g by deleting from any path (in ) that is played with zero probability under . This amounts to deleting from any path which is in and which is played with zero probability under . So, certainly,
is reached with strictly positive probability under . So, in this case, ( ( h))( h) = 1. Indeed, this is true more generally, i.e., for each ( h) (whether or not it is in ) ( ( h))( h) = 1. We use these facts repeatedly below. Now, we de…ne an assessment ( ; ) of the di¤erence tree SE,f g . Choose = ( 1 ; : : :
, so this is well de…ned.) Likewise, choose so that each ( h)(n) = ( ( h))(n), for each node in h. (Recall that each ( ( h))( h) = 1, so this is well de…ned.) We will show that ( ; ) is a sequential equilibrium of the di¤erence tree, so that f g 2 S( SE,f g ). Since, by construction, any outcome allowed by is allowed by , this will establish the result.
It is immediate from the construction that each i ( h i ) is a best reply under . So, it su¢ ces to show that ( ; ) is consistent.
Since ( ; ) is consistent, there is some ( k ; k ) ! ( ; ) where each k is completely mixed and each k is derived from k by conditioning. As such,
Note, by construction k is completely mixed and k is derived from k by conditioning. Moreover, using the fact that each
Next, recall the following de…nitions from Myerson (11, 1978) . A pro…le of completely mixed strategies " = ( Proof. Consider the game given in Figure 4 .1. There is a proper equilibrium where Ann plays Lef t (at the initial node) with probability one. To see this, note that there is an "-proper equilibrium where Ann uses (unnormalized) weights (1 : fLeft-left, Left-rightg, Proof of Theorem 4.1. By Propositions 1 and 3 in Kreps and Wilson (6, 1982) , S SE satis…es (E) and (R). By our Proposition 4.1, S SE also satis…es (D). By Myerson (11, 1978 , p.79), S PE satis…es (E). For (R), start with a proper equilibrium and an associated sequence of "-proper equilibria " . There is an " such that i is optimal under on node x vs. node y. Likewise, corresponding to the three proper equilibria of the subtree, there are three sequential equilibria. In particular, Figure 4 .4 is again a di¤erence tree under sequential equilibrium. The distinction is that there is a sequential equilibrium of this third di¤erence tree in which Ann plays Lef t. (The details are the same as for the sequential equilibrium of the original tree.) So, this time the Di¤erence property is satis…ed (as required by Theorem 4.1).
Under properness, the situation is di¤erent. The strategies Lef t-lef t and Lef t-right for Ann are undominated in the original game of Figure 4 .1-in fact, Lef t is played in a proper equilibrium. But they are weakly dominated in the di¤erence tree of Figure 4 .4-and so, cannot be part of a proper equilibrium. This happens because, in the course of forming the di¤erence tree, a move for Bob has been eliminated. After this elimination, a previously undominated strategy for Ann becomes dominated.
We can now see that, at least in 'hindsight,' the non-monotonicity in BI which we identify in this paper is not at all surprising. Here are the key steps:
Start with a solution concept which satis…es BI. (In our example, this is sequential equilibrium.)
Next consider a stronger solution concept. (In our example, this is proper equilibrium.)
The stronger solution concept may prune more moves in forming a particular di¤erence tree. (In our example, this is the move Out for Bob.)
From elementary game theory, we know that when we prune a move for one player in a game, we can change previously good strategies for other players into bad strategies. (In our example, these are the strategies Lef t-lef t and Lef t-right for Ann.)
Suppose such a previously good strategy is played under the stronger solution concept on the overall tree. Then, this solution concept will fail Di¤erence-hence BI. (In our example, Ann's playing Lef t is indeed part of a proper equilibrium of the overall tree.)
The point is actually a very elementary one. Of course, we need our Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 to convert the in-principle argument into a speci…c instance of interest.
We note in passing that there is another (potential) source of a failure of Di¤erence. In our example, Figure 4 .4 was a di¤erence tree for both the solution concept S and the re…nement R. However, a re…nement might also rule out a di¤erence tree altogether-again leading to a failure of Di¤erence.
Discussion
We have proposed a de…nition of BI, namely Di¤erence, shown that it exhibits a basic non-monotonicity, and described the implication we think this has for the re…nements program. In this section, we discuss some other possible de…nitions of BI, the question of whether some non-equilibrium solution concepts satisfy Di¤erence, and some open issues.
a. History The idea of relating the solution on the whole tree to solutions on subtrees has a long history in game theory. As already mentioned, the idea of a di¤erence tree goes back to Kuhn (8, 1953, p.204) , who also showed that subgame perfect equilibrium satis…es a di¤erence-like property (8, 1953, p.208 ). Kohlberg and Mertens (5, 1986 , pp.1012-1013) proposed a di¤erence-like property as one of several possible de…nitions of BI. They stated-but did not prove-that sequential equilibrium satis…es their di¤erence property. See also Pimienta (13, 2009 ).
Next, we review some other attempts in the literature, and, continuing the discussion at the end of Section 3, point to an another subtlety in the de…nition of Di¤erence.
b. Projection Several papers have put forward a Projection property as the de…nition of BI. (See, e.g., Kohlberg and Mertens (5, 1986 , p.1012) and Hillas and Kohlberg (4, 2002, Section 10) .) This is the property that "a solution of the game induces a solution in any subgame" (5, 1986, p.1012) .
At …rst sight, Projection seems to …t the idea of BI. It looks like it uses the solutions on the parts of the tree to pin down the solution on the overall tree-this time, using the solutions on the subtrees rather than on the di¤erence trees to do so. But, it turns out that solutions on subtrees may be insu¢ cient for this purpose. As such, Projection may fail to deliver the BI outcome.
To see why, let us try to formalize the Projection property. Start with a game and a subtree . Given a pure strategy s i in , write s i for the restriction of s i to -i.e., for the restriction of s i to the information sets in . Given a mixed strategy i in , de…ne a mixed strategy i in by
Call i the restriction of i to .
(P) A solution concept S satis…es Projection (on G) if for each tree (in G) the following holds:
For each subtree and component Q 2 S( ), there is a component Q 2 S( ) such that for each ( 1 ; : : : ; I ) 2 Q which reaches , the restriction of ( 1 ; : : : ; I ) to the subtree is contained in Q .
That is, (P) attempts to use the behavior on a reached subtree to pin down behavior on the overall tree.
However, a solution concept may satisfy (E), (R), and (P) on the family of PI trees satisfying SPC, yet fail to deliver the BI outcome in these trees. Indeed, consider the solution concept of extensive-form rational Nash equilibrium, which we denote S RNE . (Thus: f g 2 S RNE ( ) if = ( 1 ; : : : ; I ) is a Nash equilibrium in extensive-form rational strategies for .) It is readily veri…ed that S RNE satis…es (E), (R), and (P) (on all trees). But, clearly, S RNE ( ) may include a component which is not outcome equivalent to BI (on an SPC tree).
Perhaps, we should modify the de…nition of Projection, so that we can use all subtrees-not just reached subtrees-to pin down behavior in the overall tree.
(P 0 ) A solution concept S satis…es Projection 0 (on G) if, for each tree (in G) the following holds: For each subtree and component Q 2 S( ), there is a component Q 2 S( ) such that for each ( 1 ; : : : ; I ) 2 Q, the restriction of ( 1 ; : : : ; I ) 2 Q to the subtree is contained in Q .
Do (E), (R), and (P 0 ) give the BI outcome? Still not. Set G = f ; g, where is again the tree in Figure 3 .2 and is again the subtree which begins after Ann's choice of In. De…ne a solution concept S on G by S( ) = ffOut; Ing fLef tgg and S( ) = ffLef tgg. Then, S satis…es (E), (R), and (P 0 ) on G, but fails to deliver the BI outcome on this family of trees.
The problem is that while the solution S( ) is used to pin down Bob's behavior in , it cannot be used to pin down Ann's behavior in , because she has no move in . With (D), even if Ann has no move in , we can use a component Q of the solution on to pin down Ann's behavior in , since Ann does have a move in the associated di¤erence tree. We conclude that even (P 0 ) does not give a method for using the solution on the parts to pin down the solution on the whole, while (D) does give such a method.
c. De…nition of Di¤erence Now, back to the de…nition of (D). We already explained (in Section 3) why we require the solution on the whole tree to be contained in the solution on a di¤erence tree, and not vice versa. Here, we point out another subtlety.
We formulated our Di¤erence property in terms of outcomes not strategies. In accordance with this, the statement of Theorem 3.1(i) also involves outcomes: It says that (E), (R), and (D) give the BI outcome-not the BI strategies.
We cannot improve Theorem 3.1(i) so that it delivers the BI strategies, even if we restrict attention to the family of PI trees satisfying No Relevant Ties (Battigalli (1, 1997) ). (This is a subfamily of the PI trees satisfying SPC.) The solution concept of extensive-form rationalizability (Pearce (12, 1984) ) is outcome equivalent to BI on PI trees satisfying NRT (1, 1997, Theorem 4). So, using Theorem 3.1(ii), extensive-form rationalizability satis…es (E), (R), and (D) on this family of trees. But, it need not yield the BI strategies on such trees. See Figure 3 in Reny (14, 1992) for an example.
In light of this, perhaps we should restate (D), so that it is a requirement on strategies and not outcomes. Speci…cally:
(SD) A solution concept S satis…es Strategy-wise Di¤ erence (on G) if for each tree (in G) and each subtree of the following holds. Let Q 2 S( ). Then there exists a Q 2 S( ) and a P S 2 S( S;Q ) such that for each (s 1 ; : : : ; s I ) 2 Q, the restriction of (s 1 ; : : : ; s I ) to S;Q is contained in P S .
One might think that, in the proof of Theorem 3.1(i), we can replace (D) line-by-line with the stronger requirement of (SD) and reach a stronger conclusion-viz., that we get BI strategy-wise and not just outcome-wise. But this is false. Figure 5 .2. Per the new induction hypothesis, suppose that the solution on this subtree gives the BI strategies. Now consider the associated di¤erence tree in Figure 5 .3. By (E) and (R), Ann must choose In. From this, (E) and (SD) say that, in the original tree, Ann must choose some strategy and this strategy must be consistent with In. But this strategy need not be In-Down-it could be In-Across. Certainly, then, if replace (D) with (SD), our proof will not yield the stronger conclusion. We conjecture that a solution concept can satisfy (E), (R), and (SD), even though it fails to give the BI strategies. (Of course, it must give the BI outcome.) One more variation. Fix a solution concept where each nonempty component is a singleton. In this case, we could formulate Di¤erence in terms of expected payo¤s rather than outcomes: Given a component Q 2 S( ), we could ask that there is a nonempty (singleton) component Q 2 S( ) such that, when we replace with a terminal node whose payo¤s are the expected payo¤s under Q , there is a component Q 0 of the solution on the new tree that induces the same outcomes as Q.
We can mimic the proofs of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 to show that sequential equilibrium will satisfy this expected-payo¤ version of Di¤erence, but proper equilibrium won't. As such, the message of this paper would be unchanged. This said, there is no clear way to extend this version of Di¤erence to solution concepts with multi-valued components. Many solution concepts have multi-valued components. The non-equilibrium solution concepts discussed next are good examples. Figure 5 .3 d. The Axiomatic Approach As we emphasized in the Introduction, our de…nition of BI is axiomatic-it is a requirement of a solution concept, but does not make reference to other solution concepts. So, in particular, it does not make reference to equilibrium concepts. Therefore, our approach allows us to ask whether non-equilibrium solution concepts satisfy BI. Two natural candidates are extensive-form rationalizability (EFR) and the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IA for "iterated admissibility"). (5, 1986 ), modi…ed to allow us to talk about outcomes rather than strategies.) Consider the subtree following Ann's play of Lef t. By (E) and (A), the solution on the subtree requires Bob to play Lef t. Now, refer to the di¤erence tree in Figure 5 .5 and note that, by (E) and (A), Ann must play Lef t in this tree. So, by (E) and (D), Ann must play Lef t in the original tree. This yields the (2; 2) outcome. But a similar argument applies to the subgame following Ann's play of Right. This yields the (2; 3) outcome-a contradiction. 
